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Abstract The debate over whether Frankfurt-style cases are counterexamples to
the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) has taken an interesting turn in recent
years. Frankfurt originally envisaged his attack as an attempting to show that PAP is
false—that the ability to do otherwise is not necessary for moral responsibility. To
many this attack has failed. But Frankfurtians have not conceded defeat. Neo-
Frankfurtians, as I will call them, argue that the upshot of Frankfurt-style cases is
not that PAP is false, but that it is explanatorily irrelevant. Derk Pereboom and
David Hunt’s buffer cases are tailor made to establish this conclusion. In this paper I
come to the aid of PAP, showing that buffer cases provide no reason for doubting
either its truth or relevance with respect to explaining an agent’s moral
responsibility.
Keywords Frankfurt-style cases  Moral responsibility 
Principle of alternative possibilities  Abilities  Tracing
Almost 40 years ago Harry Frankfurt (1969; reprinted 1988) crafted an ingenious
case which purportedly described a scenario in which an agent was morally
responsible for the action he performed and yet was unable to have done otherwise.
Frankfurt’s key insight was that it seems possible for there to be circumstances
which render it impossible for an agent to do otherwise and yet these same
circumstances play no role in bringing about what the agent does. In such cases it
appears that the agent acts on his own and thus is morally responsible, despite
lacking the ability to perform any alternative action. These cases, and their variants,
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have come to be known as ‘Frankfurt-style cases’ or ‘FSCs’ for short. Many,
however, and the present author included, resist conceding that FSCs demonstrate
the falsity of the principle of alternative possibilities:
(PAP) Necessarily, an agent is morally responsible for u only if the agent was
able to have done otherwise.1
For many, the truth of PAP is simply too obvious and secure within our moral
theorizing to be overturned by some rather peculiar cases. Some have argued that
PAP follows from the moral maxim ‘ought implies can’ (Copp 2003; Yaffe 2005),
while others have maintained that PAP is embedded in our ordinary practices of
excuses and exemptions (Glover 1970). Regardless of the route, many have and still
do find PAP and its ilk immensely plausible. This commitment to PAP has led them
to try to show that FSCs fail to truly describe a case in which an agent is morally
responsible and yet unable to do otherwise. The debate has spawned a prolific and
exceedingly interesting literature.2 The hotly debated question had been whether
FSCs falsify PAP. In order to defend PAP against this attack one only had to
identify a single remaining alternative that the agent was able to realize. In recent
years, however, proponents of FSCs have re-envisaged their attack. According to
neo-Frankfurtians, as I will call them, instead of FSCs calling into question the truth
of PAP, they call into question its relevance.3
Neo-Frankfurtians claim that PAP is intended to identify a condition that (partly)
explains an agent’s moral responsibility.4 Defenders of PAP are concerned not just
with its truth, with whether the ability to do otherwise is necessary for moral
responsibility, but also with its relevance for explaining moral responsibility. As
Leon and Tognazzini (forthcoming) have pointed out, there are two ways in which
FSCs can succeed. They can succeed by showing that PAP is false—that the ability
to do otherwise is not necessary for an agent’s moral responsibility. But they also
can succeed by showing that PAP is irrelevant to explaining an agent’s moral
responsibility—even if the ability to do otherwise is necessary.5 Consequently, in
1 PAP has had numerous formulations, partly in attempt to refine it against Frankfurt’s attack, but this
simple formulation will serve for present purposes.
2 See Widerker and McKenna (2003) for a helpful introduction.
3 I will sometimes, for convenience, speak of PAP being explanatorily relevant, whereas strictly speaking
we are concerned with whether someone’s satisfying PAP is relevant to explaining his moral
responsibility.
4 Clearly no one thinks that such an ability is sufficient grounds for moral responsibility. In addition one
must meet certain conditions of cognitive competence. At most, the ability to do otherwise is part of what
explains the agent’s moral responsibility.
5 As I have characterized neo-Frankfurtians, they dispute not the truth of PAP, but its relevance. One
might, however, think it is best to construe both traditional and neo-Frankfurtians as challenging the truth
of PAP. According to this interpretation, the difference between traditional and neo-Frankfurtians
concerns how they understand the content of the principle. Traditional Frankfurtians think that PAP
merely claims that the ability to do otherwise is necessary for moral responsibility; whereas, neo-
Frankfurtians think PAP claims, or should claim, that the ability to do otherwise is both necessary and
explanatorily relevant. Nothing of substance will turn on these different characterizations of the debate.
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order to defend PAP against the neo-Frankfurtian attack one must do more than
show that FSCs fail to eliminate all abilities to do otherwise: one must go onto show
that FSCs give us no reason to doubt that these remaining abilities (partly) explain
the agent’s responsibility. And it is this second task that neo-Frankfurtians dispute.
Notably, Pereboom (2001), and independently Hunt (2005), have developed FSCs,
known as buffer cases, which purport to show that an agent is morally responsible
and this is not even partly explained by the fact that the agent was able to do
otherwise. Many have thought that buffer cases are devastating to the supposed
relevance of PAP (cf. Baker 2006).
In this paper I will argue that buffer cases give us no reason to judge that PAP is
irrelevant to explaining moral responsibility. The structure of the dialectic is
important to keep in mind. I am not here concerned with (directly) arguing that PAP
is either true or relevant to moral responsibility.6 Everything that I argue for in this
paper is consistent with both the falsity and irrelevance of PAP as I am concerned
exclusively with showing that buffer cases pose no challenge to the relevance of
PAP. This is an important conclusion as it does seem that we have good reasons for
thinking that PAP is true and relevant to moral responsibility. As mentioned above,
many have argued that PAP, or a close relative, follows from the moral maxim that
‘ought implies can’. Moreover, there is reason to think that PAP is embedded in our
ordinary practices of excuses and exemptions. If it is true that someone genuinely,
through no fault of her own, was unable to have done otherwise, then we normally
excuse her from moral responsibility. I assume, then, that there is some weight in
favor of PAP, and thus FSCs in general, and buffer cases in particular, should be
construed as attempting to defeat or outweigh these initial considerations. My task is
to show that buffer cases do no such thing.
I begin by clearing up what is at issue in debates concerning PAP-like principles
and elucidating the neo-Frankfurtians challenge. I then develop a detailed criticism
of such cases arguing that they fail to pose any threat to the explanatory relevance of
the ability to do otherwise.
1 The principle of alternative possibilities
PAP’s name and frequent formulation derives from Frankfurt’s famous criticism of
it (Frankfurt 1969/1988).7 However, the above formulation is subject to multiply
ambiguities which need to be cleared up before we can accurately assess its truth
6 I am indirectly defending its truth and relevance insofar as I am arguing that a reason that is often
appealed to for thinking that PAP is false and/or irrelevant is really no reason at all.
7 This really is an unfortunate name for the principle as it tends to lead people to think that what is at
stake is whether certain alterative sequences might have occurred; whereas, what we are really concerned
with is whether the agent was able to have brought about these alternative sequences. But the name
appears too firmly embedded in the literature to have any chance of being over turned. It thus is important
that we keep in mind that the defender of PAP thinks that moral responsibility does not merely require
that something else could have happened, but that the agent was able to bring this something else about.
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and relevance—particularly with respect to the neo-Frankfurtian’s attack. At one
extreme, the principle seems too strong. If we disambiguate it in a way that makes it
require that an agent be able to do otherwise at the moment of action, then there are
straightforward counterexamples. Martin Luther’s famous, ‘‘Here I stand, I can do
no other’’, if taken at face value serves as one counterexample (cf. Dennet 1984,
p. 133). Luther is morally responsible for the action of refusing to recant even
though it was impossible for him to do otherwise at the moment of recanting. At the
other extreme, the principle seems too weak. If we disambiguate it in such a way
that makes it require only that the agent be able to have done otherwise at some
moment in his life, then it is hard to understand why such an ability is necessary for
moral responsibility. That Luther was able to order wine rather than beer for dinner
is hardly necessary for his being morally responsible for not recanting.
I suggest that the following principle makes important progress in disambigu-
ating PAP:
PAP1: Necessarily, an agent S is morally responsible for u-ing at t2 only if S
(i) was able at t2 to avoid responsibility for u-ing at t2 or (ii) if S is unable at t2
to avoid responsibility for u-ing at t2, then there is some earlier time t1 at
which S w-ed (where w might be an action or omission) that explains why S is
unable at t2 to avoid responsibility for u-ing at t2 and S was able at t1 to avoid
responsibility for w-ing at t1.
PAP1 makes it clear that what is at stake in principles like PAP is the ability to avoid
responsibility for some event rather than being able to bring about some alternative
event.8 What is crucial for moral responsibility is not that I am able to prevent the
action from occurring, but that I am able to avoid responsibility for its occurring.9
Another virtue of PAP1 is that it disambiguates PAP in a way that avoids both of the
above extremes and settles on a more plausible intermediate. It weakens, but, so I
would suggest, not too much, the relevance of avoidability for moral responsibility
by introducing a ‘‘tracing’’ condition. That Luther was unable to avoid responsibility
for recanting at the moment of action does not preclude him from being morally
responsible. According to PAP1, he may still be morally responsible just so long as
his current state of inability traces back to—i.e., is explained by or grounded in—
earlier actions he performed or failed to perform, and moreover he could have
avoided responsibility at the moment of action for these earlier actions. So PAP1
only entails that moral responsibility requires avoidability at the moment of action
for certain actions. I will come back to the notion of tracing in the final section of
this paper as it plays a central role in my defense of PAP1. But let us now turn to
buffer cases.
8 Cf. McKenna (1997), Wyma (1997), and Otsuka (1998) who argue for a similar understanding of PAP.
The ability to avoid responsibility for u is a narrower ability than the ability to do otherwise than u. If one
has the ability to do otherwise than u, then one has the ability to avoid responsibility for u, but not vice
versa.
9 Of course, preventing the action from occurring is one, albeit slightly awkward, way of avoiding
responsibility for it: one cannot be responsible for what did not happen.
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2 Buffer cases
It is well-known that the prospects of devising a scenario in which an agent is
morally responsible and yet completely unable to avoid responsibility are bleak.10
Rather than encumber the reader with this intricate debate I will simply assume that
it is highly unlikely that such cases are possible and explore whether, if this is true,
the Frankfurtian must concede the debate to the proponent of PAP1. Neo-
Frankfurtians think not. According to them, FSCs call into question the relevance of
PAP1. FSCs allow us to see that the ability to avoid responsibility is simply
irrelevant to explaining an agent’s moral responsibility. Consider David Hunt’s
buffer case, Revenge:
Jones, while attending a party, is deliberately humiliated by Smith. The first
thought that occurs to Jones, after realizing what Smith has done to him, is that
he would like to kill Smith. He leaves the party, escaping the immediate
pressures of the situation and giving himself ample opportunity to pull back
from this line of thinking. Given the kind of person Jones is, and given the
situation in which he finds himself, the alternative of not killing Smith is not
unthinkable for him; moreover, should he entertain this alternative, nothing
would prevent him from deciding and acting on it. But Jones could decide
(and act) otherwise only if he first considered acting otherwise, and he never
does this (though he could); instead, he nurses his grievance without respite,
while the idea of killing Smith becomes more and more attractive to him.
Having finally decided to do the deed, he gets a gun from his car, returns to the
party, and shoots Smith dead….The final element to be added to Revenge is
the counterfactual intervener, which differs from the device in [earlier FSCs]
inasmuch as it is programmed to hijack Jones’s mental processes and force
him to decide to kill Smith if he so much as considers not killing Smith. With
this device in place, there is no alternative to Jones’s deciding to kill Smith:
Jones can decide otherwise only if he first considers doing so, but then the
device will force him to decide to kill Smith. So an alternative decision is not
available to Jones in Revenge…[y]et Jones, who in fact proceeds to murder
Smith on his own, leaving the device untriggered, seems morally responsible
for killing Smith. (Hunt 2005, pp. 132–135)11
There are three features of buffer cases that need highlighting: (i) the prior sign
that signals Black’s need for intervention is merely a necessary condition for Jones’s
not deciding to kill Smith, (ii) this necessary condition can obtain at any time prior
to his decision to kill Smith, and (iii) Jones is able to bring about the necessary
condition.12
10 I say bleak, but not indefensible. See Fischer (2006) for just such a defense. The bleakness of
contriving such an example is shown by the Kane–Widerker dilemma. See Kane (1996, pp. 142–143) and
Widerker (1995).
11 See also Pereboom (2001, pp. 18–37) for his Tax Evasion case which is structurally identical.
12 These three features distinguish buffer cases from traditional FSCs and blockage cases. For examples
of the latter kind of cases see Mele and Robb (1998, 2003).
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First, Jones’s considering not killing Smith, in the absence of Black, is not
sufficient for his not deciding to kill Smith. There are possible worlds in which
Jones considers not killing Smith, and yet still goes on to decide to kill Smith on his
own and hence is responsible for such a decision.13 Black, however, does not want
to take any chances. Even though Jones’s considering not killing Smith is only
necessary for his not deciding to kill Smith, Black decides to set things up so that if
Jones so much as even considers not killing Smith, Black will intervene and force
Jones to decide to kill Smith. Second, it is possible that Jones considers not killing
Smith at any moment up to his deciding to kill Smith. This feature makes it clear
that there is no condition, prior to action, which causally determines Jones’s
deciding to kill Smith. If there were such a condition, then Jones’s responsibility
would be highly questionable. Third, whether this sign is manifested is up to Jones
in the sense that he is able to consider not killing Smith and able not to consider not
killing Smith. These last two features of buffer cases are intended to make it clear
that the circumstances which make it impossible for Jones to do other than decide to
kill Smith play no role in bringing about what Jones does.
What should we make of such cases? It does seem plausible to judge that Jones is
morally responsible for deciding to kill Smith, but then again, it is also clear that
Jones was able to avoid responsibility for deciding to kill Smith. Recall that Jones
was able to consider not killing Smith and if he did this Black would have
intervened, forced Jones to decide to kill Smith, and thus Jones would escape
responsibility for this decision.14 So although normally (i.e. in the absence of Black)
Jones’s considering not killing Smith is consistent with Jones’s being responsible
for deciding to kill Smith, given Black’s presence, Jones’s exercising his ability to
consider not killing Smith is sufficient for his avoiding responsibility for deciding to
kill Smith. Does this pose a problem for buffer cases? Hunt and Pereboom think not
since, after all, the neo-Frankfurtian challenge is to the relevance of PAP1, not its
truth. Pereboom explains:
it may be that a condition is necessary for some phenomenon A but sometimes
holds by virtue of features that do not illuminate A, features that are irrelevant
to explaining the nature of A. I believe that even if it turns out that [the
availability of alternative possibilities] are necessary for moral responsibility,
they can hold by virtue of features of a situation that are explanatorily
irrelevant to what would make an agent morally responsible, and that as a
result the condition at issue fails to illuminate the nature of the phenomenon.
(Pereboom 2001, p. 25)
To illustrate that these two things—a necessary condition and an explanatory
condition—can come apart, notice that many conditions which are necessary for
moral responsibility appear to be explanatorily irrelevant. For example, that
2 ? 2 = 4 is a necessary condition for an agent’s responsibility for u-ing since
13 Of course Black will be absent in such a world.
14 I will move seamlessly between ‘the ability to consider not killing Smith’ and ‘the ability to avoid
responsibility for deciding to kill Smith’ throughout the paper since, in this context, the latter ability is
constituted by the former ability.
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there is no possible world in which the agent is responsible for u-ing and that
2 ? 2 = 4. Nonetheless, it is clear that this mathematical truth does not even partly
explain why the agent is morally responsible. The relevant question, then, is not
whether Jones was able to avoid responsibility, but whether it is plausible to think
that this ability partly explains why Jones is responsible for deciding to kill Smith.15
Hunt and Pereboom think it is clear that it does not. They suggest the following
obstacle to this ability’s relevance for explaining Jones’s responsibility. Consider
Jones’s epistemic situation. Black is a covert manipulator. Jones does not
understand that his considering not killing Smith will trigger the intervener,
subsequently causing him to decide to kill Smith and thus avoid responsibility for
this decision. In the absence of Black, exercising this ability is merely necessary for
avoiding responsibility for not deciding to kill Smith–Jones’s considering not killing
Smith is consistent with his being responsible for deciding to kill Smith. Hence
Jones does not understand that by making such a consideration seem salient he will
thereby avoid responsibility for deciding to kill Smith, he does not understand that,
in the present context, his considering not killing Smith is inconsistent with his
being responsible for deciding to kill Smith. Because of this, the ability to consider
not killing Smith is irrelevant to explaining his responsibility. Let us refer to this as
the ‘epistemic condition for relevance’: an ability to do otherwise is relevant to
explaining why an agent is morally responsible for u-ing only if the agent
understands that in exercising this ability he would thereby avoid moral
responsibility for u-ing.16
15 I am skeptical that mathematical truths are relevantly analogous to the ability to do otherwise with
regard to being necessary conditions for moral responsibility, and thus while I concede that a necessary
condition and explanatory condition can come apart, it is a mistake to construe defenders of the relevance
of PAP as conflating these two notions. First, it is part of our pre-theoretical understanding of moral
responsibility that it requires avoidability. The same cannot be said for mathematical and logical truths
such as that 2 ? 2 = 4. If the person who stepped on our toes convinces us that he was not able to avoid
responsibility for stepping on our toes, then we are inclined to excuse him from responsibility. Second,
that Jones was able to consider not killing Smith and hence avoid responsibility for deciding to kill Smith
is only contingently true, unlike the supposed necessary truths of mathematics and logic. The set of
possible worlds in which 2 ? 2 = 4 is empty and hence it is far from surprising or interesting to point
out that there are no worlds in which 2 ? 2 = 4 and an agent is morally responsible. There are no worlds
in which 2 ? 2 = 4 and so clearly there are no possible worlds in which 2 ? 2 = 4 and someone is
morally responsible. There are, however, worlds in which Jones is unable to avoid responsibility for
deciding to kill Smith and so it is interesting and perhaps surprising that there are no worlds in which
Jones is responsible for deciding to kill Smith and yet unable to avoid responsibility for deciding to kill
Smith. This should make it clear that defenders of the explanatory relevance of PAP do not mistakenly
infer the relevance of the ability to do otherwise from the fact that it is a necessary condition. Rather, it is
the fact that the ability to do otherwise is a distinctive kind of necessary condition that leads people to
think that it is explanatorily relevant.
16 This principle is borrowed from Pereboom (2001, p. 26), in particular the notion of understanding.
Pereboom never states exactly what he has in mind by this notion. I will assume that all that is required
for understanding that p is that someone possesses a certain set of dispositions. So an agent understands
that p if and only if she stands ready to assert that p or take p as a premise in further reasoning and so on.
In this way one can understand things that one never thinks about. I understand that if the sun is yellow all
over it cannot simultaneously be orange all over. I understand this, not because I have ever entertained
this proposition, but because were you to ask me if this is true, I would say ‘yes,’ I would employ this
proposition as a premise in an argument and so on.
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To bring out the plausibility of the epistemic condition consider an analogous
case. Imagine that Jones was able to take a sip of coffee prior to deciding to kill
Smith, and he did not understand that by drinking the coffee he would thereby avoid
responsibility since, unbeknownst to him, there is a deadly form of poison in the
coffee that will instantly kill him upon consumption. Jones was able to take a sip of
the coffee and had he done this he would have avoided responsibility for deciding to
kill Smith since he would have died and thus not made the decision. But it seems
simply incredible to think that in this case Jones’s responsibility is explained by that
fact that he was able to take a sip of coffee since he did not understand the
consequences of this action (cf. Pereboom 2001, p. 26).17 The epistemic condition
does indeed seem plausible.
Jones’s considering not killing Smith appears clearly to violate the epistemic
condition and so it seems that Revenge succeeds at showing that PAP1 is irrelevant
to explaining Jones’s responsibility. Although Jones was able to avoid responsibility
for deciding to kill Smith, and thus Jones satisfies PAP1, his ability fails to explain
why he is responsible for deciding to kill Smith. Buffer cases provide, as it were, a
buffer zone between explanatorily irrelevant and relevant abilities. In order for
Jones to possess an ability that is relevant to explaining his moral responsibility—
such as an ability to refrain from deciding to kill Smith—he must first exercise his
ability to consider not killing Smith. But once he does this Black will immediately
intervene and force him to decide to kill Smith. Black’s presence, therefore, appears
to sever any access Jones has to alternatives which are relevant to explaining his
responsibility without Black’s presence itself bringing about what Jones does. If this
is correct, then buffer cases provide good reason to conclude that PAP1 is irrelevant
to explaining responsibility.
3 The failure of buffer cases
Even though buffer cases mount an important challenge to the relevance of PAP1, I
believe that they ultimately fail: they give us no reason to doubt that Jones’s ability
to consider not killing Smith, and thus his ability to avoid responsibility, partly
explains why he is responsible for deciding to kill Smith. But before I argue for this
contention I need to make salient a feature of buffer cases that is often overlooked.
Returning to Revenge, suppose that Jones decided to kill Smith at t3.
18 Was he
able at t3 to do otherwise than decide to kill Smith? Perhaps surprisingly the
17 Hunt also suggested to me a similar line of argument during the Q/A time when I presented an earlier
version of this paper at 2007 Society of Christian Philosophers, Mountain-Pacific Region Meeting. I take
this to indicate that Hunt accepts (or at least is inclined to accept) the epistemic condition for relevance.
18 The time index in ‘Jones decided to kill Smith at t3’ is ambiguous: it might mean ‘Jones [decided to
kill Smith at t3]’ or ‘Jones [decided to kill Smith] at t3’. In the latter case the index attaches to the time of
the decision and in the former it attaches to the content of the decision. Similar points apply to ‘Jones
considered not killing Smith at t3.’ In both cases the time index is to be disambiguated in the latter way.
Thus, ‘Jones decided to kill Smith at t3’ is equivalent to ‘Jones [decided to kill Smith] at t3’ and ‘Jones
considered not killing Smith at t3’ is equivalent to ‘Jones [considered not killing Smith] at t3’. Although
these disambiguations are clearer I find them awkward and thus will continue to employ the ambiguous,
albeit more natural, wording.
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answer is ‘Yes’. Recall that the second and third salient features of buffer cases
guarantee that Jones was able, at any moment up to his making the decision, to
consider not killing Smith. These features of buffer cases make it clear that at no
time prior to Jones’s decision was there a sufficient condition for his making the
decision and hence his decision to kill Smith was not determined. Whether an
agent can be responsible for a decision that is determined by factors beyond his
control is a hotly contested question and much of the force of FSCs would be
lost if they depended on a particular answer to it. But, then, this means that
instead of deciding to kill Smith at t3, Jones was able at t3 to consider not killing
Smith at t3. I believe this is often overlooked since, if Jones had considered not
killing Smith at t3, Black would have intervened and forced Jones to decide to
kill Smith at some later time. But this does not diminish the importance of this
point: at the moment of decision, at t3, Jones was able to do otherwise and thus
avoid responsibility for deciding to kill Smith at t3. Jones then satisfies clause (i)
of PAP1. This point will become important below.
But remember that neo-Frankfurtians dispute the relevance, not the truth of
PAP1 and so they need not object to my claim that Jones satisfies (i) of PAP1.
What they must insist on is that this ability does not even partly explain why
Jones is responsible for deciding to kill Smith. The rest of my paper will be
concerned with rebutting this claim. My strategy will be to show that Jones’s
ability to consider not killing Smith satisfies Hunt and Pereboom’s epistemic
condition for relevance. As this is the only reason Hunt and Pereboom offer for
thinking that the remaining ability to avoid responsibility in buffer cases cannot
explain Jones’s moral responsibility, by showing that this ability does satisfy the
epistemic condition I will thereby show that buffer cases pose no threat to the
relevance of PAP1.
So what reason is there to think that Jones’s considering not killing Smith
satisfies the epistemic condition? Once we realize that Jones was able, at the
moment of decision, to consider not killing Smith it becomes clear—at least when
we insert the relevant time indices—that his ability satisfies the epistemic condition.
The first thing to notice is that if Jones considered not killing Smith at t3, he would
thereby have avoided responsibility for deciding to kill Smith at t3 and this has
nothing to do with the presence of Black. Deliberating at t3 about whether to kill
Smith is inconsistent with deciding to kill Smith at t3. Consequently, if Jones
exercised his ability to consider not killing Smith at t3, he would not have decided to
kill Smith at t3 and therefore would have avoided responsibility for deciding to kill
Smith at t3. After all, one cannot be morally responsible for something that never
happened. Moreover, Jones understands all this. He understands that deliberating
about whether to u at time t is inconsistent with deciding to u at t. Presumably Jones
understands that if he considered not killing Smith at t3, then he would thereby
avoid responsibility for deciding to kill Smith at t3. Had we asked Jones later if it
was possible for him to be responsible for deciding to kill Smith at t3 even though he
was considering not killing Smith at t3 he would say ‘No’. Upon further prompting
he might go onto explain that his considering not killing Smith at t3 is inconsistent
with his deciding to kill Smith at t3. Since, in such a situation, he could not and
would not have decided to kill Smith at t3, then he could not and would not be
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responsible for deciding to kill Smith at t3.
19 ‘‘One cannot be responsible for what
doesn’t happen,’’ he might add. Therefore, Jones’s ability to avoid responsibility—
i.e. his ability to consider not killing Smith—intuitively satisfies Hunt and
Pereboom’s epistemic condition for relevance: his exercising this ability is sufficient
to avoid responsibility and he understands this.
Hunt and Pereboom fail to distinguish two different senses in which Jones’s
considering not killing Smith is sufficient for his avoiding responsibility for
deciding to kill Smith. The first sense of avoidance is that Jones’s considering not
killing Smith at t3 is sufficient for his avoiding responsibility for deciding to kill
Smith at the time of action, namely t3, and at any later time. The second sense of
avoidance is that Jones’s considering not killing Smith at t3 is sufficient for his
avoiding responsibility for deciding to kill Smith at the time of action. When
avoidance is understood in the first sense, it is true that Jones failed to understand
that by considering not killing Smith at t3 he would thereby avoid responsibility
for deciding to kill Smith at t3 and at any later time. Jones’s considering not
killing Smith at t3 is sufficient for his avoiding moral responsibility for deciding
to kill Smith at t3 and at any later time only because of Black’s presence and
powers, and Jones is unaware of these facts. By exclusively focusing on the first
sense of avoidance, Hunt and Pereboom’s claim that Jones’s ability to avoid
responsibility is not relevant to explaining responsibility gains plausibility. But
once we notice the availability of a second sense of avoidance, we are able to see
that this ability does indeed satisfy the epistemic condition. Jones’s considering
not killing Smith at t3 is sufficient for avoiding moral responsibility for deciding
to kill Smith at t3 and this connection holds independent of Black’s presence.
Moreover, Jones understood that his considering not killing Smith at t3 precluded
the possibility of deciding to kill Smith at t3. Therefore, Jones’s ability to
consider not killing Smith, his ability to avoid responsibility, does indeed satisfy
the epistemic condition for relevance.
Buffer cases therefore fail to show that PAP1 is explanatorily irrelevant to moral
responsibility. These cases are designed to constitute a counterexample to the
explanatory relevance of the ability to avoid responsibility by showing that an agent
can be responsible even though he does not understand that any of his abilities are
such that by exercising one of them he will thereby avoid responsibility. Revenge
seemed to fit the bill for neo-Frankfurtians. At first glance it appeared that Jones was
responsible for deciding to kill Smith at t3 even though none of his abilities were
such that Jones understood that by exercising it he would thereby avoid
responsibility. But appearances can be deceiving. I argued that Jones’s ability to
consider not killing Smith at t3 was just this kind of ability: Jones understood that by
exercising it he would thereby avoid responsibility for deciding to kill Smith at t3.
I also appealed to the ambiguity inherent in the term ‘avoidance’ to explain why
Hunt and Pereboom failed to consider this response. There are two senses in which
an agent can avoid responsibility. The first, and stronger, sense of avoidance is that
19 If Jones lacks this rather minimal level of understanding about the nature of action, deliberation and
responsibility, then one might doubt whether he meets the minimal level of competence to be responsible
in the first place.
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an agent’s ability to u at t is sufficient for his avoiding responsibility for u at t and at
any later time. The second, and weaker, sense of avoidance is that an agent’s ability
to u at t is sufficient for his avoiding responsibility for u at t. It is by exclusively
focusing on the first and stronger sense of avoidance that Revenge appears to be a
counterexample to the explanatory relevance of PAP1. However, once we
distinguish these senses of avoidance, we realize that Revenge is no such thing: it
gives us no reason to doubt that Jones’s ability to consider not killing Smith at t3, his
ability to avoid responsibility, is relevant to explaining his responsibility for
deciding to kill Smith at t3.
4 Objections and replies
4.1 Objection 1
A possible objection that arises at this juncture maintains that I am mistaken in
assuming that the second sense of avoidance is the relevant sense in the present
context. Rather, according to this objection, it is the first sense that is relevant and
since I admit that Jones does not understand that his ability to consider not killing
Smith is sufficient to avoid responsibility for deciding to kill Smith in this sense of
avoidance, it follows that this ability fails to satisfy the epistemic condition for
relevance.
4.2 Reply to objection 1
But even if this objection is sound, it raises no problem for my contention that buffer
cases fail to show that PAP1 is explanatorily relevant. Hunt and Pereboom need
there to be a single sense of avoidance under which the epistemic condition is true
and Jones’s ability to consider not killing Smith at t3 does not satisfy it. But there is
no such sense of avoidance: Hunt and Pereboom face a dilemma. Either they adopt
the first or second sense of avoidance. If they adopt the first sense, then Jones’s
ability to consider not killing Smith at t3 does indeed violate the epistemic
condition, but this turns out to be unproblematic since the epistemic condition under
this reading of ‘avoidance’ is false. If they adopt the second sense of avoidance, then
the epistemic condition is true but Jones’s ability to consider not killing Smith at t3
satisfies it.
I have defended the second horn above. There I argued that Jones understood that
his ability to consider not killing Smith at t3 is such that by exercising it Jones would
have avoided responsibility for deciding to kill Smith at t3. Let me now defend the
first horn. According to this horn, Hunt and Pereboom can insist that the first sense
of avoidance is the relevant sense only at the expense of undermining any
plausibility that their epistemic condition seemed to have. This sense of avoidance is
too strong as can be seen by the fact that it becomes absurdly easy to show that the
PAP1 is not explanatorily relevant: one can do so without even having to appeal to
FSCs. Rarely if ever do we possess an ability such that we understand that by
exercising that ability we will thereby avoid responsibility at the time of action and
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at any later time. We are often in situations in which we have the opportunity to
exercise an ability that is sufficient for avoiding responsibility for an action at the
time of action, but not for avoiding responsibility for that action at any later time.
Consider someone who in a burst of anger is tempted to make a demeaning remark
to his friend and acts on this temptation. In normal circumstances we would think
this person possessed the ability to refrain from making this remark and thus is able
to avoid responsibility for making the remark. But is his ability to refrain from
making the demeaning remark relevant to explaining his moral responsibility for
making this remark? Clearly not, at least so long as we assume that the first sense of
avoidance is the relevant sense. Even if this person had exercised his ability to
refrain from making the demeaning remark, it is still possible at some later time that
he will again become angry but this time succumb to the temptation and make the
demeaning remark. Consequently, his ability to refrain from making the remark is
not such that if he exercised it he would thereby avoid responsibility for making the
demeaning remark at the time of action and at any later time. And, by hypothesis,
PAP1 is not explanatorily relevant since none of the agent’s abilities satisfy the
epistemic condition.
This result suggests that the first sense of avoidance is too strong. Abilities such
as the friend’s ability to refrain from making the demeaning comment may indeed
fail to be explanatorily relevant, but not because they fail to satisfy the epistemic
condition under the first reading of avoidance. It is too stringent to require for
explanatory relevance that exercising the ability results in one’s avoiding
responsibility at the time of action and at any later time. Instead, it is sufficient
that exercising the ability allows one to avoid responsibility at the present time—
what happens later is immaterial. Therefore, buffer cases face serious problems
regardless of the sense of avoidance that we adopt.
4.3 Objection 2
According to this objection, my argument above does indeed show that Revenge
fails to cast the explanatory relevance of PAP1 into doubt, but maintains that there is
a way to modify Revenge in order to avoid my above argument. So, this objection
concedes that my argument succeeds against a particular instance of a buffer case,
but denies that it shows that buffer cases in general fail to show that PAP1 is not
explanatorily relevant. Hunt and Pereboom can modify Revenge by placing a
temporal gap between when Jones is able to consider not killing Smith and his
actual decision to kill Smith. Hunt and Pereboom might stipulate that, necessarily, if
Jones fails to consider not killing Smith by t1, then he will decide to kill Smith at t3.
Not only is Jones’s considering not killing Smith a necessary condition for not
deciding to kill Smith at t3, but Jones’s considering not killing Smith by t1 is a
necessary condition for not deciding to kill Smith at t3. But, just as in Revenge, if
Jones does consider not killing Smith by t1, then Black will intervene at t2 and force
Jones to decide to kill Smith at t3. Hence, at t3 it is impossible for Jones to do other
than decide to kill Smith. The only way he can try to do otherwise is if he, by t1,
considers not killing Smith and yet if he does this Black will intervene and force
Jones to decide to kill Smith at t3. Everything else proceeds just as it does in
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Revenge. Jones never considers not killing Smith and hence at t3 is unable to avoid
responsibility for deciding to kill Smith. Nonetheless we might still judge that Jones
is responsible for making this decision. After all he chose to do it for his own
reasons, he was not coerced, and so on. Let us refer to this case as RevengeTG.
20
4.4 Reply to objection 2
Although Hunt and Pereboom do not actually offer this version of a buffer case, it
strikes me as a very plausible way to refashion this kind of case in order to avoid my
above objection. Consequently, if we are to have any confidence that buffer cases do
not pose a threat to the explanatory relevance of PAP1, it must be shown that
RevengeTG, like Revenge, fails. I turn now to developing an argument that shows
just this.
Notice first that in RevengeTG, unlike in Revenge, Jones clearly does not satisfy
(i) of PAP1: there was nothing Jones was able at t3 to do to avoid responsibility for
deciding to kill Smith at t3. However, Jones does satisfy (ii) of PAP1. As (ii) of
PAP1 makes clear, an agent can be responsible for u-ing at t even though he was
unable at t to avoid responsibility for u-ing just so long as there is some earlier
action or omission w that explains why he is unable at t to avoid responsibility for
u-ing and the agent, at this earlier time, was able to avoid responsibility for w-ing.
In RevengeTG, Jones lacks the ability at t3 to avoid responsibility for deciding to kill
Smith, but this is explained by his omitting to consider not killing Smith at t1 and
Jones was able at t1 to avoid responsibility for failing to consider not killing Smith
at t1—just at (ii) requires.
So Jones satisfies PAP1, but as before this is unproblematic for Hunt and
Pereboom since their claim is that buffer cases pose a threat to the relevance, not the
truth of PAP1. As before, their argument that Jones’s satisfying this clause cannot
possibly explain why he is responsible for deciding to kill Smith at t3 is that he fails
to satisfy the epistemic condition for relevance: Jones does not understand that by
considering not killing Smith by t1 he will thereby avoid responsibility for deciding
to kill Smith at t3.
21
I believe, however, that even this more elaborate case fails, but for very different
reasons. Unlike in Revenge, Jones’s ability to consider not killing Smith does not
satisfy the epistemic condition with respect to his decision to kill Smith in
RevengeTG. It is true that if Jones considered not killing Smith at t1, then he would
thereby avoid responsibility for deciding to kill Smith at t3. By deliberating about
what to do at t1, Jones forces Black’s hand and thus excuses himself from
responsibility. But Jones does not understand any of this. It is hard to imagine that a
rational agent could fail to understand that deliberating about whether to u at t
precludes the possibility of u-ing at that exact same moment. But it is not
20 ‘TG’ stands for ‘temporal gap’.
21 Of course Hunt and Pereboom do not maintain this in the sense that these claims never appear in their
work. I will continue to speak of ‘Hunt and Pereboom maintaining this’ and ‘Hunt and Pereboom arguing
for that’ but it should be kept firmly in mind that I am merely speculating here on what they might say.
These speculations notwithstanding, I do believe that RevengeTG poses an interesting threat to PAP1 and
so it is worth showing why it also fails.
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implausible to think that Jones was unaware that his considering not killing Smith at
t1 was inconsistent with his deciding to kill Smith at t3. The connection between
considering not killing Smith at t1 and avoiding responsibility for deciding to kill
Smith at t3 obtains only in virtue of Black’s presence—of which Jones is quite
unaware. Hence, it does seem that Jones fails to understand that by considering not
killing Smith at t1 he will thereby avoid responsibility for deciding to kill Smith
at t3.
But although I concede that Jones’s ability to consider not killing Smith at t1 does
not satisfy the epistemic condition with respect to his decision to kill Smith at t3, I
deny that he must satisfy it in order for this ability to be relevant to explaining his
responsibility. In this case Hunt and Pereboom’s condition is too strong.
Interestingly, the epistemic condition for the relevance of an ability appears to
differ depending on whether the ability satisfies clauses (i) or (ii) or PAP1. When an
ability that satisfies (i) partly explains an agent’s moral responsibility for u-ing, it
must satisfy Hunt and Pereboom’s epistemic condition for relevance. However,
when an ability that satisfies (ii) partly explains an agent’s moral responsibility for
u-ing, then this epistemic condition need not be satisfied. This is a difference that is
worth trying to understand in its own right, but in the present context it will suffice
to show that there is such a difference.22
Part of the motivation for including clause (ii) in PAP1 is the realization that
we play an important role in shaping who we become and the kind of
circumstances we are in.23 If character and circumstances render us unable to
avoid responsibility, then it might seem that those features of the world assail us
in a way that render us excused from responsibility. However, if we brought about
our character and/or circumstances and we were able to avoid responsibility for
doing so, then it is plausible to think we are responsible for actions that issue forth
from our character and circumstances. Luther’s ‘Here I stand I can do no other’
fits the latter mold. Visiting Rome and seeing the abuses, composing and posting
the 95 theses, combating his various theological opponents, publically burning the
papal bull and so on all served to mold him into the kind of person who would
not, indeed could not recant and renounce his disagreements with the Roman
Catholic Church.
According to (ii) of PAP1, if the ability to consider not killing Smith at t1 is
relevant to explaining Jones’s responsibility for deciding to kill Smith at t3 at all,
then it is only indirectly relevant. There are two steps here. The first is to show that
Jones’s responsibility for deciding to kill Smith at t3 is grounded in or traces back to
his responsibility for omitting to consider not killing Smith at t1. The core idea
behind ‘‘tracing’’ is that an agent can be responsible for u-ing at t even though he
does not satisfy certain conditions for moral responsibility at t—e.g. cannot do
otherwise—just so long as his failure to satisfy these conditions at t is grounded in
or explained by an earlier action(s) for which he is responsible. An often cited
example of where tracing is appropriate is the case of a drunk driver running over a
pedestrian. In such a case it is reasonable to suppose that the drunk driver is
22 I am thankful to Paul Hoffman for pointing out the possibility of this asymmetry.
23 For recent discussions of this important theme see Kane (1996) and Ekstrom (2003).
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responsible for killing the pedestrian even though he lacked the needed control for
moral responsibility at the time of the killing. It is reasonable to suppose this
because he is responsible for getting drunk and his responsibility for killing the
pedestrian traces back to his responsibility for getting drunk.
The second step is to show that Jones’s being able to consider not killing Smith at
t1 partly explains why he is responsible for omitting to consider not killing Smith at
t1. It is in this sense that Jones’s ability to consider not killing Smith is indirectly
relevant to explaining his responsibility for deciding to kill Smith at t3: it partly
explains his responsibility for omitting to consider not killing Smith at t1 which in
turn partly explains his responsibility for deciding to kill Smith at t3.
24 In cases that
involve tracing, an ability can be relevant to explaining the agent’s responsibility for
u-ing even if it fails to be such that if he exercised this ability he would thereby
avoid responsibility. Such an ability can still be relevant if it satisfies the epistemic
condition with respect an earlier action for which he is responsible and his
responsibility for this earlier action grounds his responsibility for u-ing.
There are then two steps I need to establish. The first step consists in showing that
Jones’s responsibility for deciding to kill Smith traces back to his omitting to
consider not killing Smith. The second step consists in showing that his ability to
consider not killing Smith partly explains his responsibility for omitting to consider
not killing Smith. If both of these steps can be established, then it will be clear that
Jones’s ability to consider not killing Smith by t1, even though it does not satisfy the
epistemic condition with respect to his decision to kill Smith at t3, is nonetheless
relevant to explaining his moral responsibility for deciding to kill Smith at t3.
My task here is not to show that each one of these steps is undoubtedly true, but
that buffer cases provide no reason for doubting their truth. Consider the second step
first. Does Jones’s ability to consider not killing Smith at t1 partly explain why he is
responsible for omitting to consider not killing Smith at t1? It would seem so and
buffer cases give no reason to the contrary. There is prima facie reason to think that
the ability to avoid responsibility partly explains an agent’s moral responsibility.
We often cite just such a factor when explaining an agent’s responsibility.
Moreover, buffer cases fail to call this ability’s relevance into doubt since this
ability satisfies the epistemic condition with respect to Jones’s omitting to consider
not killing Smith at t1. Jones understood that by considering not killing Smith at t1,
he would thereby avoid responsibility for omitting to consider not killing Smith at
t1. Jones understands that his considering not killing Smith at t1 would make it
24 Nothing here turns on the nature of omissions. Some have thought that only non-occurrences of which
an agent considered count as omissions. Under this definition of omissions Jones’s not considering not
killing Smith would not be an omission, but only a mere non-occurrence since Jones does not consider
this action. I am inclined to a more liberal understanding of omissions, but regardless of one’s view of
omissions, we can trace responsibility back to a non-occurrence even when the agent has not considered
this option as cases of negligence show. Suppose I negligently forget to set my alarm clock and as a result
am late for a very important meeting the next morning. My boss might reasonably hold me responsible for
being late precisely because I forgot to set my alarm and so proved myself to be irresponsible. However,
in this case I did not deliberate about whether to set the alarm. The problem is that setting the alarm never
occurred to me. Fischer and Ravizza (1998, pp. 124–125) make a similar point. Whether or not mere non-
occurrences count as omissions we can trace responsibility back to mere non-occurrence and so I need not
take a stand on the nature of omissions.
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impossible for him simultaneously to omit to consider not killing Smith at t1.
Moreover, he understands that if he considered not killing Smith at t1, then he
cannot be responsible for omitting to consider not killing Smith at t1: how can one
be responsible for something that did not happen? Thus, Jones’s ability to consider
not killing Smith does satisfy the epistemic condition with respect to omitting to
consider not killing Smith. And as this ability’s failing to satisfying the epistemic
condition is the only reason that Hunt and Pereboom offer for doubting its
relevance, we have reason to think that Jones’s ability at t1 to consider not killing
Smith is explanatorily relevant for his responsibility for omitting to consider not
killing Smith at t1.
25 Consequently, if we can establish the first step, PAP1 is
vindicated against the neo-Frankfurtian challenge.
Establishing this step is less straightforward, but again I think buffer cases give
no reason to doubt its truth. One might explain that the reason Jones’s moral
responsibility for deciding to kill Smith traces back to his responsibility for omitting
to consider not killing Smith is that this omission is tantamount to deciding to kill
Smith. Jones’s omitting to consider not killing Smith by t1 is tantamount to deciding
to kill Smith at t3 because this omission, together with certain uncontested necessary
conditions for Jones’s deciding to kill Smith at t3, like Jones’s not dying before he
gets a chance to make this decision, is sufficient for Jones’s deciding to kill at t3.
26
Even though Jones was unable to decide not to kill Smith at t3, he is still responsible
for deciding to kill Smith because he is responsible for an earlier omission and this
earlier omission is tantamount to his deciding to kill Smith at t3.
Supposing that Jones’s omission is tantamount to his deciding to kill Smith, does
this make it reasonable to think that Jones’s responsibility traces back? Hunt and
Pereboom might argue that it does not by appealing to a new epistemic condition: an
agent S’s responsibility for u-ing can trace back to his responsibility for w-ing only if
were S to avoid responsibility for u-ing he would thereby avoid responsibility for w-
ing. This is an epistemic condition not for when an ability is explanatorily relevant to
responsibility, but for when moral responsibility for an action/omission can trace
back to earlier actions/omissions. Jones does not understand that by considering not
killing Smith at t1 that he will thereby avoid responsibility for deciding to kill Smith
at t3 since he is ignorant of Black’s presence. Therefore, his responsibility for the
decision cannot trace back to his responsibility for the omission.
Whatever plausibility Hunt and Pereboom’s epistemic condition for the
explanatory relevance of an ability has, it is lacking for this epistemic condition
concerning tracing. Return to the drunk driver case. Does the drunk driver
understand that by not getting drunk he will thereby avoid responsibility for killing
the pedestrian? Certainly not since his failing to get drunk is not sufficient for his
avoiding responsibility for killing the pedestrian. For example, suppose after finally
succeeding in resisting his temptation to have another drink, he drives towards home
25 Although I have suggested both that we have reason to think that Jones’s ability at t1 to consider not
killing Smith is explanatorily relevant and that buffer cases give us no reason to doubt this, strictly
speaking I only need to establish the latter claim since my goal is to defend PAP1 against buffer cases and
not to show directly that PAP1 is explanatorily relevant.
26 I am grateful to Derk Pereboom for providing helpful suggestions on how to make the tantamount
relation more precise.
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completely sober. Unfortunately he is incredibly tired and falls asleep at the wheel,
veers off the road and runs over the same poor pedestrian. It is reasonable to judge
that he is responsible for killing the pedestrian because he negligently drove his car
when he knew he shouldn’t have. Consequently, failing to get drunk is not sufficient
for avoiding responsibility for running over the pedestrian, but it is nonetheless
something to which we can trace the drunk driver’s responsibility. Hunt and
Pereboom’s new epistemic condition for when the agent’s earlier responsibility for
an action/omission can ground an agent’s later responsibility for an action/omission
is too strong.
This becomes especially clear when we acknowledge the relevant time indices.
Does the drunk driver understand that by not getting drunk at t1 he will thereby
avoid responsibility for running over the pedestrian at t3? It seems not since he
might get drunk at t2, start driving at t2.5 and run over the pedestrian at t3. But again
this possibility does not show that we cannot trace the drunk driver’s responsibility
back to his responsibility for getting drunk at t1. So Jones’s failing to satisfying this
new epistemic condition for tracing presents no obstacle to his responsibility for the
decision tracing back to his responsibility for his omitting to consider not killing
Smith.
Now, exactly what epistemic condition an agent must satisfy in order for it to be
fair to trace his responsibility back to his responsibility for earlier actions or
omissions is a controversial and difficult matter. But even without knowing
precisely what the epistemic condition is, I believe that we still can conclude that
buffer cases pose no threat to tracing Jones’s responsibility back to this omission.
First, note that it seems that the cases of Jones and the drunk driver are relevantly
similar so that if one case involves tracing it is likely that the other case does too.
And since the case of the drunk driver is a paradigm case of tracing, Jones’s case
also seems to fit the mold. Second, often the notion of ‘could have reasonably
foreseen’ is invoked: the drunker driver’s responsibility traces back only if he could
have reasonably foreseen that by getting drunk he might cause harm to someone.27
Likewise, we might say that Jones could have reasonably foreseen that not
deliberating about whether to kill Smith might lead to his killing Smith. Since Jones
could have reasonably foreseen this consequence, he is responsible for deciding to
kill Smith because he failed to consider not killing Smith.
So it seems reasonable to trace Jones’s responsibility for deciding to kill Smith
back to his responsibility for omitting to consider not killing Smith. This omission is
tantamount to deciding to kill Smith and although Jones may not have understood
all the details, he could have reasonably foreseen that omitting to consider not
killing Smith might lead to his deciding to kill Smith. Moreover, Jones’s
responsibility for omitting to consider not killing Smith is itself partly explained
by Jones’s ability to consider not kill Smith. I conclude then that buffer cases do not
throw doubt on either Jones’s satisfying PAP1 or this fact’s partly explaining why
Jones is responsible for deciding to kill Smith.
27 See Fischer and Tognazzini (2009). In this paper they provide a range of possible epistemic conditions
that govern tracing cases in an attempt to respond to some skeptical challenges raised by Vargas (2005).
The interesting thing to note is that Jones satisfies them all.
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5 Conclusion
Buffer cases thus fail to pose any threat to PAP1. First, they clearly fail as
counterexamples to the truth of PAP1: in both Revenge and RevengeTG Jones
satisfies PAP1. Moreover, in both of these cases it is reasonable to cite Jones’s
ability to consider not killing Smith in an explanation of his moral responsibility for
deciding to kill Smith, or at least buffer cases give us no reason to doubt its
relevance. With regard to Revenge we saw that Hunt and Pereboom faced a
dilemma: either they adopt the strong reading of avoidance and so their epistemic
condition is false, or they adopt the weak sense of avoidance and Jones satisfies their
epistemic condition. But either way there is no single sense of avoidance under
which the epistemic condition is true and Jones fails to satisfy it. In RevengeTG
things were a bit more complex but none the more problematic. We saw that Jones’s
ability to consider not killing Smith was indirectly relevant to explaining his
responsibility for deciding to kill Smith. Jones’s ability to consider not killing Smith
satisfied Hunt and Pereboom’s epistemic condition with respect to avoiding
responsibility for omitting to consider not killing Smith and hence this ability is
directly relevant to explaining his responsibility for omitting to consider not killing
Smith. Moreover, we saw that Jones’s responsibility for deciding to kill Smith
traced back to his responsibility for omitting to consider not killing Smith and hence
Jones’s ability to consider not killing Smith was indirectly relevant to explaining his
responsibility for deciding to kill Smith. That buffer cases fail to pose any threat to
the relevance of PAP1 is an important conclusion for proponents of PAP1 and
similar principles. Although I have not shown, and have not tried to show, that PAP1
is true and relevant to explaining moral responsibility, I have cleared the ground
from one of the most threatening obstacles to the truth and relevance of this
principle. The door is thus wide open, or least more widely open, for proponents of
PAP1 to run their usual arguments for the truth and relevance of this principle.
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